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 Digital repression of political speech gained prominence during the Arab Spring 
when governments acknowledged the power of networked collective action. The shutdown 
strategies that proliferated from the Arab Spring expanded around the globe. Now, almost 
a decade later, India leads the world in government-mandated digital repression. The rapid 
expansion of the internet and mobile penetration, combined with long-standing civil unrest, 
created a volatile issue within India. The use of strategic shutdowns by Indian authorities 
attempts to contain and reduce the conflict-related violence while limiting collateral 
economic damage. To investigate such efforts, this thesis examines patterns of civil 
violence across Indian states in the wake of digital repression events. This research 
employs both quantitative and qualitative approaches to analyze the relationship between 
violence and digital shutdowns using data on civil unrest, including protests, riots, military 
operations, and digital shutdowns in India. The evidence indicates that while the goal of 
India’s use of strategic shutdowns is to contain and reduce conflict-related violence, 
strategic shutdowns actually result in increased violence in the days following the 
shutdown event. These findings indicate that shutting off the internet and cell phone 
services is not an effective approach to preventing internal violence. 
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1 
I. THE AGE OF DIGITAL LIBERATION, 
DIGITAL REPRESSION AND NETWORKED 
COLLECTIVE ACTION 
A. THE INTERSECTION OF THE INFORMATION AGE AND SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS 
Since the onset of the Information Age, networked collective action has been the 
most prominent form of uprising in modern social movements. States, especially 
authoritarian states, are increasingly efficient at suppressing online dissidents’ ability to 
plan, coordinate and mobilize social movements, despite the global proliferation of 
information and communication technology (ICT). While the battle for digital control of 
information between dissidents and states swings back and forth, states appear to be 
gaining the upper hand.1 
Both the 2009 Green movement in Iran, and in early 2011 the Arab Spring, 
demonstrated to the world the power behind online tools for collective action in recent 
uprisings.2 More than seven years later the repression of online dissidents is steadily 
increasing as a result, primarily in authoritarian states. Less discussed is how repression is 
evolving in democracies as well.  
B. THE RISE OF NETWORKED COLLECTIVE ACTION 
The Information Age has established the cyber domain as a prominent component 
of statecraft. As the technology matures, there is an international race between states to 
acquire digital tools, as both offensive weapons and defensive barriers to maintain 
relevance in this new global environment. The unique aspect of this human made domain 
is that it has opened a space that previously did not exist, empowering networked 
                                                 
1 Steven Heydemann and Reinoud Leenders, “Authoritarian Learning and Authoritarian Resilience: 
Regime Responses to the ‘Arab Awakening,’” Globalizations 8, no. 5 (October 1, 2011): 647–53, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2011.621274. 
2 Negar Mottahedeh, #iranelection: Hashtag Solidarity and the Transformation of Online Life, 1st 
edition (Redwood City, CA: Stanford Briefs, 2015); Zeynep Tufekci, Twitter and Tear Gas: The Power 
and Fragility of Networked Protest (New Haven ; London: Yale University Press, 2017). 
2 
individuals to challenge nation-states in the information battle. Digital tools are not only 
available to states but also by non-state actors.  
The digital age is also ushering in a new era of collective action, marked by its 
ability to rapidly network collective grievances and establish new media outlets that 
challenge conventional state media. It is important to note that the spread of ICTs does not 
necessarily correlate to peace, but also increases in violence.3 Unquestionably, the Arab 
spring demonstrated to the world the power of networked protests. Before the Arab Spring, 
internet activism was coined as “slacktivism” by both autocratic and democratic countries 
around the world and “authorities in many countries had derided the internet and digital 
technology as ‘virtual’ and therefore unimportant.”4 However, when network enabled 
protests struck the world in 2011, many regimes did not initially crack down harder on the 
movements before they began to mobilize and eventually gave way to revolutions.5 The 
surge that was the Arab spring swept the world, and with it, a new era of repression 
emerged as states quickly learned to mobilize effective defenses against this subversive 
behavior. Now there is a simmering race between dissidents and states to dominate the 
digital domain, as the balance of power slides back and forth. On this new power dynamic 
in the cyber landscape, Larry Diamond states in his article “Liberation Technologies”, 
“Authoritarian states could commandeer digital ICT to a similar effect. To the extent that 
innovative citizens can improve and better use these tools, they can bring authoritarianism 
down—as in several cases they have.”6  
Organized movements are not a new phenomenon, “Collective actions, social 
movements, and revolutions are woven into the fabric of human history. They are studied 
at great length and for a good reason: they change history.”7 Cyber tools and platforms 
                                                 
3 T. Camber Warren, “Explosive Connections? Mass Media, Social Media, and the Geography of 
Collective Violence in African States,” Journal of Peace Research 52, no. 3 (May 2015): 297–311, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343314558102. 
4 Tufekci, Twitter and Tear Gas, 16. 
5 Tufekci, Twitter and Tear Gas, 16. 
6 Larry Diamond, “Liberation Technology,” Journal of Democracy 21, no. 3 (July 14, 2010): 69–83, 
https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.0.0190. 
7 Tufekci, Twitter and Tear Gas, xix.  
3 
have adjusted the landscape and lowered the threshold of participation so that anyone with 
connectivity can take part in the movement. It is also critical to understand that social 
movements are not only harnessed by revolutionaries seeking social change and states 
seeking control, but also by “terrorist groups such as ISIS and white-supremacist’s groups 
in North America and Europe … to gather, organize, and amplify their narrative.”8 The 
convoluted, yet organized chaos which is the cyber domain continues to evolve, but one 
thing remains true throughout the literature: there is power in the rapid diffusion of 
information, and the next global struggles around the world will have to consider the 
liberation or repression aspects of the cyber domain. 
C. DIGITAL LIBERATION 
Despite the recent attention stemming from the Arab Spring on networked 
collective action, the concept of using computers for activism existed both in theory and 
practice well before the first tweet in the Twitter revolutions. In 1994, the Critical Arts 
Ensemble (CAE) published an essay about the use of cyberspace and technology for direct 
activism, by replicating traditional civil disobedience techniques such as blocking streets 
and transferring it into the cyberspace by blocking the digital streets (or digital access). The 
essay, titled “Electronic Civil Disobedience” or (ECD) would become a center post for 
future networked collective actions to use.9 Groups, such as the electrohippies in the late 
1990s would use Distributed Denial of Service or (“DDoS”) techniques to conduct “virtual 
sit-ins.”10 Molly Sauter writes that “Hacktivists considered the primary goal of hacktivism 
or technology-based activism to be defeating state censorship and the disruption of online 
communications via the creation and distribution of tools to evade censorious regimes.”11  
                                                 
8 Tufekci, Twitter and Tear Gas, xix. 
9 Molly Sauter and Ethan Zuckerman, The Coming Swarm: DDOS Actions, Hacktivism, and Civil 
Disobedience on the Internet (New York; London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), 41. 
10 Sauter and Zuckerman, 39-40. 
11 Sauter and Zuckerman, 46-47. 
4 
In 1998, John Perry Barlow in his statement, “Cyberspace Independence 
Declaration” summarized sentiments that would sweep the world during the social media 
enhanced revolutions in the Arab Spring, 
Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. 
You have neither solicited nor received ours. We did not invite you. You do 
not know us, nor do you know our world. Cyberspace does not lie within 
your borders. Do not think that you can build it, as though it were a public 
construction project. You cannot. It is an act of nature, and it grows itself 
through our collective actions.12 
The statement is idealistic, and not entirely accurate as we have seen states slowly 
establish borders around their networked cyberspace, but it still encapsulates the battle of 
liberation and repression that is currently sweeping the technological world. 
Unquestionably there is a draw the pulls a global response to isolated repression events.  
Digital liberation has given way to new media, which has allowed people to report 
on news independently, expose corruption, express opinions and mobilize protests 
transnationally and at a faster speed of information diffusion than has ever been possible.13 
Liberation technology is defined as physical ICT’s and digital ICTs: The physical ICTs 
encompass computers, internet, cell phones to the more modern advances such as 
smartwatches. On the digital side, ICTs consist of Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, Reddit and 
the ever-evolving ecosystem of “new social media.”14 Employing ICTs to promote change 
is not a new concept, as the telegraph and printing press also had revolutionary effects on 
how social movements organized and structured while demonstrating how interconnected 
the world is.15  
                                                 
12 John Perry Barlow, “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace,” Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, January 20, 2016, https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence. 
13 Diamond, “Liberation Technology.” 
14 Diamond, “Liberation Technology.” 
15 Clay Shirky, “The Political Power of Social Media: Technology, the Public Sphere, and Political 
Change,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 1 (2011): 28–41. 
5 
Literature continually reinforces that ICTs alone are not enough to create 
revolutionary change, but they have altered the revolutionary process.16 Zeynep Tufecki 
states in her book, Twitter and Tear gas—the Power and Fragility of Networked Protests, 
that, “Technology rarely generates novel human behavior; rather, it changes the terrain on 
which such behavior takes place. Think of it as the same players, but on a new board 
game.”17 Zeynep Tufecki’s profound statement on the duality of how the digital domain is 
both fundamentally different and similar at the same time for modern revolutions. In the 
same tone, it is important to not fall into the reductive notion of “technodeterminiation” or 
that by existing, ICTs cause revolutions, but rather acknowledge that technology can 
influence the structures that make revolutions possible.18 
The primary role that ICTs play in both democratic and autocratic societies alike is 
filling the void that journalists typically fill and acting as a counter voice to the state.19 
While freedom of the press enables democratic countries to hold governments accountable, 
ICTs are bridging the gap and providing this transparency in autocratic governments and 
raising the standard of information in democratic societies simultaneously. Every protester 
with a cell phone or internet access can document and record events in real-time, allowing 
for global consumption of the information. However, Brian J. Bowe notes in his article, 
“Cosmopolitanism, and Repression of Cyber-Dissent in the Caucasus” that “activists do 
not have complete control of the situation and often must rely on Western information and 
social network corporations to provide the tools that facilitate dissent.”20 The reliance on 
western technology is highlighted by the recent international call on the U.S. to ease its 
policy surrounding ICTs and sanctions, specifically with Iran, to enable networked 
                                                 
16 Daniel P. Ritter and Alexander H. Trechsel, “Revolutionary Cells: On the Role of Texts, Tweets, and 
Status Updates in Nonviolent Revolutions,” in Conference on “Internet, Voting and Democracy,” Laguna 
Beach, CA, vol. 3 (Citeseer, 2011). 
17 Tufekci, Twitter and Tear Gas, 131. 
18 Tufekci, Twitter and Tear Gas, 119. 
19 Brian J. Bowe and Robin Blom, “Cosmopolitanism and Repression of Cyber-Dissent in the 
Caucasus: Obstacles and Opportunities for Social Media and the Web,” Journal of Media Sociology, 2011, 
5. 
20 Bowe and Blom, "Cosmopolitanism and Repression."  
6 
collective action.21 Technology companies concerned with the penalties associated with 
allowing their products to be used in Iran typically resort to blocking out Iran entirely.22 
Existing literature has also explored the area of hacker’s targets and motivations, 
often aligned with the behavior being deviant and rebellious, primarily focusing on 
boosting self-esteam, online credibility.23  However, there is an area of hacking used to 
further revolutionary agendas that are less studied, but still impactful: this form of hacking 
is called hacktivism.24 DDoS is the primary tool used by hacktivists due to its relatively 
low technical skill required for entry. Hacktivist collectives publicly distribute two DDoS 
toolkits available for hackers to participate in the global collective action. The first one is 
Electronic Disturbance Theater’s (EDT) FloodNet tool and the second one is Anonymous’s 
Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC).25 These tools allow activists to leverage technology against 
states to create effects that will enable for collective action to coalesce. The damage caused 
by DDoS is temporary, usually consisting of bumping a government site offline, but the 
result typically draws global attention through media responses and transnational 
participation through botnets (allowing a computer’s use for DDoS actions).  
DDoS techniques are not the only tool available for networked collective action. 
Virtual Private Networks (VPN) also have a significant contribution to enabling the 
mobilizing structure of online social movements. VPN’s allow people to bypass 
government blocks and surveillance by obscuring the transfer of information over the 
internet. VPNs are typically easy to install, again allowing for minimal technology 
understanding to employ and disguise a user’s “IP address” and allows access to the 
                                                 
21 Peter Harrell and Collin Anderson, “U.S. Sanctions Abet Iranian Internet Censorship,” Foreign 
Policy (blog), accessed February 3, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/22/u-s-sanction-abet-iranian-
internet-censorship/. 
22 Firuzeh Mahmoudi and Fereidoon Bashar, “Tech Companies Are Complicit in Censoring Iran 
Protests | WIRED,” accessed February 6, 2018, https://www.wired.com/story/tech-companies-are-
complicit-in-censoring-iran-protests/. 
23 Victor Asal et al., “Repression, Education, and Politically Motivated Cyberattacks,” Journal of 
Global Security Studies 1, no. 3 (August 1, 2016): 235–47, https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogw006. 
24 Victor Asal et al., “Repression, Education, and Politically Motivated Cyberattacks,” 235–47. 
25 Sauter and Zuckerman, The Coming Swarm, 109-110. 
7 
internet through an encrypted channel, which in turns opens sites that are usually blocked 
out by autocratic governments such as Twitter and Facebook.26 
Along with DDoS and VPN’s, Tor is another popular tool in a dissident’s 
collection. Tor is a highly encrypted browser that creates both anonymity and 
circumvention of state censorship.27 The complexity of Tor makes it a challenge for states 
to block out completely is the process slowly evolves into a “whack-a-mole” scenario, as 
one gets shut down another one springs up. 
D. DIGITAL REPRESSION 
Even with all the easily accessible tools for modern uprisings, states can respond 
with more resources and resiliency. The digital repression tools states have at their disposal 
fall into two categories: active and passive measures to counter networked collective 
action. 
Active measures consist of physical limitations, ranging from turning off the 
internet within the country, blocking sites or programs used by dissidents and using ICTs 
to target and remove dissidents entirely physically. Passive measures are often subtle in 
nature and consist of adjusting the narrative of a social movement, overwhelming the 
movement with misinformation or completely blacking out information from having a 
global reach. 
Anita R. Gohdes, in her article “Pulling the plug: Network disruptions and violence 
in civil conflict,” argues that governments fighting to hold political control have significant 
incentive to turn off the internet. Additionally, the cost of killing the internet is less than if 
the international community responds to atrocities discovered through ICT means.28 
Literature indicates that short-term internet shutdowns are often employed to impede 
movements in their ability to mobilize and coordinate. Large-scale movements often use 
                                                 
26 Tufekci, Twitter and Tear Gas, 221-229. 
27 Tufekci, Twitter and Tear Gas, 230. 
28 Anita R. Gohdes, “Pulling the Plug: Network Disruptions and Violence in Civil Conflict,” Journal of 
Peace Research 52, no. 3 (May 1, 2015): 352–67, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343314551398. 
8 
Twitter or texting services to coordinate mass demonstrations or marches, as the Internet 
Service Providers (ISP) and cell providers usually fall under the purview of the state, they 
are relatively easy to turn off, but it often comes with a financial cost. When Egypt shut off 
the internet during the Arab Spring in 2011, the estimated cost to the government was $90 
million.29 Studies show that if states use this extreme technique multiple times, social 
movements begin to anticipate the military action that traditionally follows an internet 
crackdown and use it as an “early warning” indicator.30 Furthermore, in the case of Egypt 
cutting off the internet entirely resulted in two additional outcomes. The first outcome was 
people already mobilized in Tahrir Square no longer needed the platforms to organize, and 
second, people who were unaware of the severity of the situation were plunged into the 
middle of it the moment the lights went out, forcing people out of their homes and into the 
streets.31  
On the less severe side of physical digital repression is content filtering and 
blocking, which is employed through firewalls and national Internet Service Providers 
(ISP).32 These techniques can be heightened and lowered with minimal notice from the 
global perspective, but on the other hand, these techniques are relatively easy for dissidents 
to combat. Traditional VPNs or encrypted web browsers such as Tor can quickly defeat 
these methods of repression, although states are responding with increased effectiveness as 
seen with the “Great Firewall of China,”33 or the Red Web in Russia, which involves 
pulling all websites under the .ru domain and creating digital country boundaries.34 
Furthermore, states can increase or decrease the internet traffic speed within their countries, 
which is even harder for protesters to deter, such as in Iran when the Ministry of 
                                                 
29 Gohdes, “Pulling the Plug: Network Disruptions and Violence in Civil Conflict.” 
30 Gohdes, “Pulling the Plug: Network Disruptions and Violence in Civil Conflict.” 
31 Tufekci, Twitter and Tear Gas. 226 
32 Leonie Maria Tanczer, Ryan McConville, and Peter Maynard, “Censorship and Surveillance in the 
Digital Age: The Technological Challenges for Academics,” Journal of Global Security Studies 1, no. 4 
(November 1, 2016): 346–55, https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogw016. 
33 Tanczer, McConville, and Maynard, “Censorship and Surveillance in the Digital Age: The 
Technological Challenges for Academics.” 
34 Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, The Red Web: The Kremlin’s Wars on the Internet, Reprint 
edition (PublicAffairs, 2017). 
9 
Information ordered all ISPs to limit the private use and internet café use to 128Kbps and 
commercial use to 512 Kbps.35 Regulating bandwidth hindered gathering protests while 
the business sector and to a greater extent, the economy, was not damaged. 
On the active side of repression, regimes can use ICT’s to trace locations of weblog 
writers or activists and conduct arrests. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRCG) 
Cyber Force is mainly known for employing this tactic. Additionally, research shows that 
regimes can counter activists by sending messages infected with viruses, trojans, and 
keyloggers.36 
On the passive measure aspect of digital repression, states can employ techniques 
such as how IRCG “Basijis” encourage the development of weblogs “to confront cultural 
invasion and promote Islamic and government-favored content on the Internet.”37 
Narrative control can have both a positive effect on the state employing the technique and 
a demoralizing impact on the political activists attempting to counter this method. 
Ultimately the battle between states and dissent is continuously evolving, and 
academic research has focused primarily on autocracies. In contrast, how democracies are 
employing repression tools, and how effective they are, has been far less studied. 
  
                                                 
35 Saeid Golkar, “Liberation or Repression Technologies? The Internet, the Green Movement and the 
Regime in Iran,” International Journal of Emerging Technologies and Society; Hawthorn 9, no. 1 (2011): 
50–70. 
36 Golkar, “Liberation or Repression Technologies? The Internet, the Green Movement and the Regime 
in Iran.” 
37 Golkar, “Liberation or Repression Technologies? The Internet, the Green Movement and the Regime 
in Iran.” 
10 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
11 
II. THE RISING TIDE OF INTERNET REPRESSION IN INDIA 
The rules India makes for its online users are highly significant – for not 
only will they apply to 1 in 6 people on earth in the near future as more 
Indians go online, but as a global power they will shape future debates over 
freedom of expression online.38 
 
A. INDIA: AUTOCRATIC STRATEGIES OF REPRESSION USED IN A 
DEMOCRACY? 
Academic literature focuses almost exclusively on autocracies’ use of repression 
against internet freedom in the modern age of networked collective action.39 The growing 
reality is that the steady decline of internet freedom is not only occurring in autocracies, 
but democracies as well are feeling the pressure of closing up the internet to ensure public 
safety.40 The golden age of seeing a globally interconnected exchange of ideas ushering in 
a new era of peace seems to have altered course, as technology has had marginal impacts 
on both shifting nation-states toward democracies, and cultures toward peace.41 This rising 
trend is especially evident in India, where one of the largest populations of the world is 
quickly coming online as internet penetration continues to increase in rural areas.42 
Additionally, India is also rapidly becoming a significant player in the Science, 
Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) community, placing second in the 
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number of STEM graduates in 2016, behind China and far ahead of the United States per 
capita.43 India’s quick rise, combined with long-standing civil unrest within the state, has 
created a boiling point in which authorities in India have imported tactics learned from 
autocracies during the Arab spring and transposed them into laws to be employed 
nationwide.44 India now dominates the world in internet shutdowns, and according to 
AccessNow’s research, India consisted of 47% of the total global internet shutdowns from 
2016 to 2017.45 This chapter will explore how India has institutionalized internet 
shutdowns as a strategy to combat issues of collective action, rumor control, contain 
violence and attempt to protect counter-terrorism activities by employing existing Indian 
law to operationalize this capability at the state level. 
B. DIGITALIZING INDIA 
India is the second most populated country in the world, just behind China, and 
consists of 17% of the world’s total population.46 Population growth projections have India 
overtaking China by 2025.47 While internet penetration in India only includes 33% of the 
country’s population in 2017, mobile penetration has dramatically spread across the 
country, reaching 92% in 2017.48 Even with only 33% of the population having an internet 
connection, India still ranks second in the number of internet subscribers, following closely 
behind China and having surpassed the United States in 2017.49 The rapid growth of the 
technology sector and the advancement of internet infrastructure within the country has 
reached a fever pitch; the evolution of the networked progress is likely caused by the global 
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understanding that ICTs have positive effects on economic growth, with the most 
substantial increase resulting from the high-speed internet.50 In a recent academic study 
Quantifying the Value of an Open Internet for India by Rajat Kathuria, Mansi Kedia, 
Vatsala Shreeti and Parnil Urdhwarshe concluded that “according to a new estimate a 10% 
increase in internet subscribers results in an increase of 2.4% in growth of state per capita 
GDP.”51 While on the other side of ICTs, research has determined that internet shutdowns 
have caused an economic loss of $968 million in India.52 The question remains, how 
effective are internet shutdowns if knowing the financial loss associated with them, they 
are still a common tactic in India to contain civil unrest?  
C. INDIA’S LEGAL JUSTIFICATION FOR INTERNET REPRESSION 
During the World Conference on International Telecommunication (WCIT) in 
2012, India stood starkly against a global internet model which allocates more control to 
national governments, more commonly understood as internet sovereignty, which was 
proposed by China, Iran, and Russia. Internet sovereignty contrasts with the European and 
Western countries approach, which is known as a multi-stakeholder model.53 While 
internally India was steadily shifting toward methods more often used by those countries 
it opposed in the 2012 WCIT. The rise of strategic shutdowns is commonly observed in 
political protests in full autocracies such as Syria, Iran, Russia, and China, setting this aside, 
India has joined the international circle of internet shutdown countries and has quickly 
overtaken them in quantity and duration by 2017.54 
Analyzing the heart of the legal justification for the use of strategic internet 
shutdowns within India, it is first essential to know where India sits globally regarding 
polity, freedom of the Net and state fragility. In 2016 the Polity IV project scored India as 
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a full democracy on the Polity scale.55 The 2016 fragility index score places India in the 
top 30% of fragile states, likely resulting from the high level of civil unrest located in the 
Kashmir region combined with the longstanding confrontational posture against 
Pakistan.56 The non-profit organization Freedom House’s considers India’s internet “partly 
free” citing some concerns with obstacles to access, and violation of users rights but overall 
not overly limited on content blocking.57 While the scores have stabilized since 2014, the 
use of strategic shutdowns is on an exponential rise, depicted in Figure 1, with data 
collected by the Software Freedom Law Centre, India.58 The number of shutdowns and 
growth rate is significantly more than any other country in the world.59 
 
Figure 1. India Internet Shutdowns60 
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The rise of internet shutdowns correlated with higher penetration of mobile and 
internet coverage across the country, combined with the learning processes of 
implementing new and old laws to fit the modern environment. There are two primary laws 
Indian authorities use to shut down the internet. The first is known as Section 69A of the 
IT Act (established in 2008) which states. 
69A Power to issue directions for blocking for public access of any 
information through any computer resource. - 
(1) Where the Central Government or any of its officer specially authorized 
by it in this behalf is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so to do, in 
the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, defense of India, security 
of the State, friendly relations with foreign States or public order or for 
preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating 
to above, it may subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) for reasons to 
be recorded in writing, by order, direct any agency of the Government or 
intermediary to block for access by the public or cause to be blocked for 
access by the public any information generated, transmitted, received, 
stored or hosted in any computer resource.61 
While Section 69A authorizes the Secretary of the Department of Information 
Technology to block internet access without delay in an emergency, the order must be 
reviewed and approved by a more extensive committee within 48 hours.62 With this said, 
according to a study on laws criminalizing expression online in Asia, even with the ease of 
using 69A authorities are turning to an older law to order internet shutdowns across the 
country, known as Section 144 of the Criminal Code of Procedure.63 Section 144 of The 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 states: 
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144. Power to issue order in urgent cases of nuisance of apprehended 
danger. 
(1) In cases where, in the opinion of a District Magistrate, a Sub- divisional 
Magistrate or any other Executive Magistrate specially empowered by the 
State Government in this behalf, there is sufficient ground for proceeding 
under this section and immediate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable, 
such Magistrate may, by a written order stating the material facts of the case 
and served in the manner provided by section 134, direct any person to 
abstain from a certain act or to take certain order with respect to certain 
property in his possession or under his management, if such Magistrate 
considers that such direction is likely to prevent, or tends to prevent, 
obstruction, annoyance or injury to any person lawfully employed, or 
danger to human life, health or safety, or a disturbance of the public 
tranquility, or a riot, of an affray. 
(2) An order under this section may, in cases of emergency or in cases where 
the circumstances do not admit of the serving in due time of a notice upon 
the person against whom the order is directed, be passed ex parte. 
(3) An order under this section may be directed to a particular individual, or 
to persons residing in a particular place or area, or to the public generally 
when frequenting or visiting a particular place or area.64 
Despite Section 144 being an older law, it is still useful for authorities, as it only 
requires the order of a police commissioner, and can be enforced for up to two months, 
with state government being able to extend the order to six months.65 Furthermore, the 
same study on censorship laws in Asia found that section 144 is primarily used during 
social or political unrest to shut down the internet.66 Some concern arose out of the 
extensive use of section 144, as some saw it as an opportunity for political misuse. In 
February 2016, a law student in India, Gaurav Sureshbhai Vyas, challenged the states’ 
broad power to shutdown the internet and mobile services, but the Indian Supreme Court 
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sided with the states, stating that shutdown’s under 144 was legal.67 The precedent set by 
the court’s findings is evident in the dramatic rise in internet shutdowns from 2016 to 2017. 
Eventually, the shutdown increase drew the attention of human rights defenders in 2017. 
In a statement from the UN Special Rapporteurs Michel Forst and David Kaye, “India must 
immediately end its ban on social media networks and mobile Internet services in the State 
of Jammu and Kashmir and guarantee freedom of expression for citizens.”68 
The critical takeaway gleaned from these two laws is that new laws are often set 
aside for old laws that fit the context of the environment and grant a more wide-ranging 
power to authorities. While initially developed in 1973, Section 144 did not take into 
account the rise of the internet. Section 69A was purposefully designed for with the internet 
in mind as can be depicted from the phrasing. All this said, the vagueness of Section 144 
implicitly applies to the internet, as the Indian courts have demonstrated. 
D. COMPARING SHUTDOWN STRATEGIES 
The Arab Spring sparked substantial research on role technology played both in 
regimes use of repression on dissent and how protesters used networks for communication 
and control. Significant attention was drawn to Egypt when on January 27, 2011, the 
government of Egypt employed a strategy that involved a mass network blackout shutting 
down everything but state-run radio and television across the country.69 While academic 
research seems to indicate the shutdown did inhibit communication of the protest, it did 
not ultimately stop the demonstrations, and further drew apolitical people into the streets.70  
                                                 
67 www.ETtech.com, “Supreme Court Upholds Internet Ban by States—ETtech,” ETtech.com, 
accessed May 25, 2018, http://tech.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/internet/supreme-court-upholds-
internet-ban-by-states/50955292. 
68 David Kaye and Michel Forst, “OHCHR | India Must Restore Internet and Social Media Networks in 
Jammu and Kashmir, Say UN Rights Experts” (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High 
Commissioner, May 2017), 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21604&LangID=E. 
69 Alexandra Dunn, “Unplugging a Nation: State Media Strategy During Egypt’s January 25 Uprising,” 
The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 2011, 10. 
70 Dunn, “Unplugging a Nation: State Media Strategy During Egypt’s January 25 Uprising,” 10. 
18 
Anita Gohdes provided an analysis of how the Syrian government employed 
network shutdowns during a time of war to enable tactical successes on the battlefield. Her 
findings suggested that battles that follow internet shutdowns were often found to have an 
increase in violence related fatalities.71 Gohdes makes the argument that these large-scale 
outages are often employed to specifically target the communication nodes of rebels, to 
weaken them before a conventional military assault. Furthermore, Gohdes makes the 
critical distinction that internet shutdowns in Syria are used to obscure atrocities caused by 
the regime. 
Research seems to indicate that shutdowns are mainly used to target communication 
and coordination nodes, but what role do ICTs play with regard to an increase or decrease 
in violence?72 Camber Warren explains that vertical ICTs (such as radio and television) 
have a pacifying effect on populations, while horizontal ICTS (cell phones and social 
media networks) seems to produce an increase in violence.73 While Warren’s analysis 
focuses primarily on rural African countries, the premise is valid. The question remains, 
does the same hold true when horizontal ICTs are shut down by the state, leaving only 
vertical structures in place? Initial research seems to indicate that shutdowns have a strong 
relationship with increased levels of violence in civil unrest, despite horizontal ICTs 
remaining intact, these results are amplified by quantitative research in Chapter III.74 
Setting aside the relationship between violence and technology, India’s use of 
digital repression seems to be centered around a tactic of strategic shutdowns as a means 
to contain violence during civil unrest. In the context of this paper, a strategic shutdown 
event is defined as targeted regional service(s) disruption, for example, shutting down 
WhatsApp and Instagram in the Kashmir Valley following the killing of a militant by 
government forces. While shutdowns can consist of multiple service disruptions, data 
collected indicates they are often confined to a specific state within India and rarely cross 
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state boundaries, unless the incident of civil unrest crosses state boundaries as well.75 The 
rarity of shutdowns crossing state boundaries is likely a result of legal restrictions discussed 
in Section 144 requiring a police commissioner within a state to authorize a two-month 
shutdown, coordination across states would require two approvals, according to the law.76  
A further breakdown and analysis of strategic shutdowns show that mobile 
networks are the primary target (see Table 1). This is likely a result of the high mobile 
penetration, and the ease of use cell phones provide protesters.77 Furthermore, hardwired 
connections are more likely to impact commercial businesses, creating a more significant 
financial impact from the shutdown.78 Of note, there are instances of shutdowns consisting 
of both internet and mobile, but it does not diminish the fact that mobile infrastructure is 
the primary target more often than not. Shutdown research is limited with regard to how 
strategic shutdowns versus network blackouts affect commercial sectors, as there is a 
growing trend of shutdowns explicitly targeting the primary source of communication for 
the civil unrest as opposed to full network blackouts. 
Table 1. Shutdown Type (India) 
Year Internet Mobile 
2016 10 24 
2017 36 51 
2018 29 26 
 
 
Why is there a growing use of strategic shutdowns versus network blackouts? 
While the government of India typically indicates whether the nature of the shutdown was 
reactive or proactive (see Table 2), a correlation could be drawn to the ill-fated effects of 
complete network blackouts during the Arab Spring, or the financial loss associated to 
complete blackouts previously discussed.79 Again, this is likely contributed to by the 
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learning process of autocracies in fighting internal unrest.80 A study released by the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in May 2018 listed 
the five most common justifications for governments in South Asia for shutting down the 
internet during 2017 (with India consisting of 84% of the South Asian shutdowns) as 1. 
Reactive, following a killing; 2. Security-related reasons; 3. Resulting from protests; 4. 
During violent events; and 5. Communal Clashes.81  
Table 2. Shutdown Nature (India) 
Year Reactive Preventive 
2016 19 12 
2017 17 54 
2018 39 11 
 
 
Analysis indicates that strategic shutdowns typically average three days in length, 
but in some instances, shutdown events have lasted more than 40 days.82 The relatively 
short duration of shutdowns gives further credence to the concept that strategic shutdowns 
are intended to do minimal disruption to society while only targeting the heart of the civil 
unrest, emphasizing the strategic aspect of the shutdown.  
E. UNDERLYING CIVIL UNREST 
The violent civil unrest in India focuses primarily in the northern part of India. The 
highest level of violence is along the border with Pakistan and in the disputed territory of 
Kashmir (see Figure 2).83 The map colors are indicative of a heat map, with the higher 
concentration of violence being shades of dark red and limited or no violence being empty 
cells. 
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Figure 2. India’s Violence, 2016–201884 
The origins of the conflict in Kashmir are traced back to the Pakistan and India split 
in 1947 and the subsequent allocation of Kashmir Valley from the British to the newly 
established nation-state of India.85 In India, Kashmir is most violent region, as this is where 
the most riots, and protests occur and where government forces are often engaging militant 
organizations. Additionally, Kashmir consists of the most non-violent and violent civil 
unrest related events. Civil unrest events are defined as collective action ranging from 
student demonstrations to counterterrorism operations (see Figure 3).  
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Figure 3. India’s Civil Unrest Events, 2016–201886 
Demonstrating the concentration of violence in India is essential to understanding 
how strategic shutdowns are employed, as Kashmir consists of a significant number of both 
shutdowns and fatalities.87 While shutdowns in India are a tactic in combating militants, 
research shows that typically the purpose is not weakening communication and 
coordination nodes of militant organizations, but rather preventing rumor control, or the 
further spread of violence.88 This analysis of India’s shutdowns contrasts with Gohde’s 
conclusion as to why shutdowns occur in Syria (shutdowns used to hide atrocities and 
weaken communication networks).89 While Syria is in a state of civil war, it is still essential 
to understand the distinction between shutdowns as means to gain a tactical advantage 
(Syria), as opposed to an attempt to contain violence (India). 
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F. INDIA’S ICT ENHANCED COLLECTIVE ACTION 
Academic research concerning the employment of ICTs in India during networked 
collective action remains sparse. That said, regional news within India provides insight into 
some of the strategies used by protesters. A commonly employed tactic to bypass 
government localized strategic shutdowns is the use of encrypted routers. The use of bypass 
technology is evident in India, demonstrated by the number of Tor users.90 Tor describes 
their service as, “free software and an open network that helps you defend against traffic 
analysis, a form of network surveillance that threatens personal freedom and privacy, 
confidential business activities and relationships, and state security.”91 Tufekci in her 
analysis of social movements and technology indicates that Tor is a commonly used tactic 
to fight government censorship and strategic shutdowns, as it allows anonymity and can 
circumvent application shutdowns.92 Tor users in India have been steadily increasing since 
2017 (see Figure 4). The rise in Tor users indicates that the population and by extension, 
protesters, are attempting to fight back against strategic shutdowns by circumventing filters 
and blocks on popular communication applications such as Telegram, Twitter, and 
WhatsApp. It is important to note that total network blackouts do render Tor ineffective, 
as Tor still requires an initial connection to use the program.  
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Figure 4. India’s Tor Users.93 
The limited amount of academic work concerning how protesters within India fight 
back against shutdowns is an indication that the balance of power with regard to the internet 
remains firmly in the hands of the central government, but the lingering question of how 
effective shutdowns are in combating violence continues to remain unanswered. 
G. LOOKING AHEAD 
Initial analysis indicates that India is falling into a pattern of repression used by 
autocracies, and while a substantial amount of research is done surrounding the financial 
aspects of shutdowns or the increasing number of shutdowns, very little attention is given 
to studying the effects they have on collective action. The remaining quantitative question 





                                                 









III. QUANTIFYING DIGITAL SHUTDOWNS AND 
CONFLICT VIOLENCE 
A. INDIA’S RISE TO REIGN IN DIGITAL SHUTDOWNS 
Authoritarian regimes are globally demonstrating that they are recovering and 
reacting to the initial shock that social media caused during the much-publicized Arab 
Spring movements.94 There is a mounting trend of social media co-option as opposed to 
digital repression, leveraging networks to produce increased regime resiliency instead of 
dissent.95 While research continues to focus almost exclusively on the evolution of 
autocratic strategies to combat digital dissent, the democratic state of India rapidly emerged 
as the new flag bearer of digital repression, dominating over 47% of the total recorded 
global shutdowns from 2016 to 2017.96 Research seems to show that India is using digital 
shutdowns as a strategy of stopping the onset of protest-related violence.97 If shutdowns 
are intended to prevent violence, the question becomes, are the days following a shutdown 
event more violent than they would have been in the absence of the shutdown? 
B. SHUTDOWN AND VIOLENCE DATASETS 
The primary purpose of this research is to study the relationship between digital 
shutdowns and violence. The data to quantify violence in the context of all civil conflict 
events (both violent and non-violent), comes from the Armed Conflict and Event Dataset 
(ACLED).98 While ACLED’s dataset on India is relatively new, and only dates to 2016, 
this does not affect the results, as India only saw 14 total shutdowns from 2012 to 2014, 
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whereas in 2017 alone, India saw 70 shutdowns.99 While little academic research exists 
explaining the reason behind India’s quick rise in digital repression, the analysis indicates 
the swift growth of internet services and the significant expansion of social media likely 
made digital platforms a target during the internal civil unrest. ACLED is commonly 
chosen for its data precision, as it breaks down the unit of analysis to a geolocated day-
event, which is critical in determining how shutdowns affect violence in the days following 
an event in India. Additionally, ACLED codes data based on actors and interactions 
allowing for detailed analysis of specific events and finally, ACLED is transparent with 
how it collects and authenticates data, allowing data verification for accuracy.100 
The second source of data comes from a combined India shutdown event dataset 
coded specially for this research. The primary source of reporting on shutdown events 
comes from the Software Freedom Law Centre (SFLC), a non-profit digital rights 
organization that operates out of India.101 The SFLC maintains a geolocated tracker that 
links to news reports of shutdowns for verification. The coded shutdown tracker also 
consists of scraped news stories of shutdowns not yet captured by SFLC but additionally 
linked to source documentation in the shutdown dataset for verification. Finally, the 
shutdown dataset was cross-referenced against the Accessnow’s dataset and International 
Federation of Journalists (IFJ)’s report on South Asia internet shutdowns to ensure 
accuracy in the coding of the final shutdown dataset.102 ACLED consist of approximately 
30,000 events for analysis, and the internet shutdown dataset consists of 150 shutdown 
events, averaging three days in duration. 
It is important to note that the leading research on internet shutdowns by Ghodes in 
Pulling the plug: Network disruptions and violence in civil conflict and Hassanpour in 
Leading from the Periphery and Network Collective Action primarily uses Google 
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transparency reports to identify network shutdowns.103 While Google transparency reports 
provide an accurate representation of extensive network shutdowns by governments, it is 
limited in the scope of only being able to effectively monitor Google specific products, 
such as YouTube, Gmail or more broadly, the Google search engine itself.104 For 
identifying strategic shutdowns, the focus of this research, that target specific regional 
communication applications such as WhatsApp, Telegram or Facebook, a focused 
temporal and geospatial dataset is required, which led to the coding of the Indian shutdown 
event dataset. 
C. DEPENDENT VARIABLE—VIOLENCE 
The dependent variable of violence is derived from ACLED. When an event results 
in fatalities of one or greater (and the fatalities are violent in nature, caused by protesters, 
security forces, or others individuals involved in the collective action) that event is 
considered a violent event for this research. The fatality and event are both geolocated with 
descriptive details of actors and interaction to ensure proper attribution. Since the 
dependent variable consists of a count of fatalities across Indian states, this indicates that 
Poisson regression is necessary to determine the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variable. Poisson regression is typically used when the dependent variable 
consiststs of positive integers, for example, a numerical count of rare events, occurrences 
or incidents over time. In the 30,000 coded events analyzed for this research, there are 
2,763 fatalities from 2016 to 2018.105 The primary location of violence within India is in 
the Kashmir region (see Figure 5) but India still experiences considerable violence 
throughout the rest of the country, this is critical to understand when analyzing violence 
across India with relationship to the independent variables.106  
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Figure 5. India, Conflict Deaths at the State Level107 
D. PRIMARY INDEPENDENT VARIABLE—DIGITAL SHUTDOWN 
EVENTS 
Shutdown events consist of mobile and (or) internet shutdowns. Shutdown events 
are either preventative or reactive, depending on whether they are used in anticipation of 
civil unrest or as a result of civil unrest. A strategic shutdown is defined in this thesis as a 
targeted regional disruption with the intent of limiting rumor control, containing protests 
and subsequent violence or in military operations as a form of operational security.  
Mobile shutdowns are defined as events in which mobile services or programs are 
limited, such as mobile-specific Short Messaging Service (SMS) or WhatsApp. Internet 
shutdowns are defined as hardwired connections being limited, with traditional targets 
being websites, blogs, network slowdowns (bandwidth limitations) or complete network 
blackouts. It is important to note that the delineation between mobile and internet 
shutdowns can overlap, but traditionally the specific service (internet service providers and 
mobile service providers) disrupted determines the shutdown type. Finally, it is important 
to note that research is limited in the scope of the regional and national news reporting of 
what services are disrupted. News articles will often state internet disruption, SMS 
disruption, mobile disruptions, or discuss what specific applications were blocked. These 
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terms are taken at face value from the news story as the targeted service that was disrupted, 
while often cross-referenced with other news sources to ensure accuracy, this is not always 
possible, falling back on the initial source alone. The shutdown variables are numerically 
annotated in individual columns as dichotomous 1 or 0 in the shutdown dataset to record if 
the occurrence of the shutdown was mobile services, internet services or a combination of 
services. The Indian shutdown event dataset consists of 152 geolocated coded events, and 
when expanded to include days in duration becomes 491 geolocated shutdown-days to 
model against geolocated violence. When analyzing shutdown events in context with state 
violence, it is essential to understand the location of shutdown events. As identified for 
violent events, shutdown events are typically concentrated in the Kashmir region (see 
Figure 6). Figure 6 was developed using data from the Indian shutdown event dataset.  
 
Figure 6. India, Shutdown Events at the State Level 
E. CONTROL VARIABLES—MILITARY OPERATIONS, PROTESTS AND 
RIOTS 
When controlling for events that cause violence on any given day in India, it is 
important to take into consideration, military operations, protests, and riots. ACLED 
provides a detailed account of these variables. Military operations are defined as any event 
with ACLED interaction codes 10 through 18.108 Military operations range from sole 
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military operations, military versus militants to military versus protesters.109 Controlling 
for military violence is essential as research indicates that military action typically results 
in violence, especially in the contested region of Kashmir. Protests and riots are defined as 
events that range from demonstrations to organized movements against government 
institutions. 
Furthermore, riots and protests can be one-sided or aimed at a specific actor.110 It 
is important to note that these variables are coded as either 1 or 0, meaning that they 
occurred or did not occur. Additionally, days of consecutive peace are also essential to 
analysis with regard to violence, as this will demonstrate if peaceful days remain peaceful 
following a shutdown or turn violent, this variable provides a continuous count of 
geolocated peaceful days that resets the counter once a violent event occurs.  
F. LAGGED VARIABLES 
A critical component in understanding the relationship between violence and digital 
repression is understanding what happens the day after the digital shutdown event. To 
properly analyze this component, lagged independent variables are developed and used. 
For this research, lag is broken down into three categories, lag1, lag2, and lag7, with the 
number corresponding to the number of days that have passed since the event (one, two- 
or seven-days post incident). Research demonstrates that digital shutdowns in India on 
average last three days, which is why lag1 and lag2 are necessary. While looking seven 
days after a shutdown event provides minimal insight since both protests and shutdowns 
on average do not last that long, some information can still be gleaned about where 
conditions are at one week after the initial event. Ultimately lagged variables allow the 
models to capture the relationship between violence and digital repression over time. 
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G. HYPOTHESES 
Since research indicates that Indian authorities are using shutdowns to contain or 
prevent violence, this leads to the first question, how useful is this strategy? Should ICTs 
be blocked to prevent or stop the spread of violence occurring within a state? 
Null Hypothesis: When all else is held constant, the days following strategic 
shutdowns will see unchanged levels of violence.  
If the null hypothesis is supported, this could indicate that the use of strategic 
shutdowns is not a valid tactic to be used against violence during civil unrest in India, as 
they have no impact on the overall violence levels. On the other hand, while existing 
research has demonstrated that digital shutdowns have a minimal impact on mobilization, 
less is known about how shutdowns affect the collective narrative during civil unrest, and 
it could be that the state can regain or control the narrative through digital repression. This 
may imply that as long as there is not an increase in violence that digital shutdowns still 
offer an incentive in the form of narrative suppression and control. However, this argument 
will not hold if shutdowns produce increased violence, especially if the ultimate goal is to 
reduce or stop the violence.  
Alternative Hypothesis: When all else is held constant, the days following strategic 
shutdowns will see an increase in violence.  
If the alternative hypothesis is supported with a positive relationship, this would 
indicate that the use of strategic shutdowns is not an effective tool to combat civil unrest 
related violence, as the violence following a shutdown tends to be increasing.  While on 
the other hand, if we instead find evidence of a negative relationship this would  
indicate that the use of strategic shutdowns is a valid tactic to be used against violence 
under the civil rest context in India, as this would indicate that shutdowns generally 
decrease violence in the affected areas. 
H. MAIN RESULTS 
Empirical evidence derived from the shutdown dataset demonstrates a significant 
relationship between digital repression and violence. Table 3 shows the results from the 
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main models. Model 1 is the baseline model, with only shutdowns and lagged shutdowns 
included as independent variables, not taking into account any control variables. Model 2 
adds three controls, days in duration (annotated as days), days of consecutive peace 
(annotated as peace_days), and military violence (annotated as military_violence), as these 
are essential factors to consider when analyzing violence. The final model, Model 3 adds 
in the last control variable, protest, and holistically looks at the relationship between 
shutdowns and violence. Adding protest into the model last is critical, as this is often the 
context in which shutdowns occur, controlling for this is the final step in ensuring that there 
truly is a significant relationship between digital shutdowns and violence. 
Furthermore, Model 3 holds the lowest Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). AIC 
is a statistical indicator that demonstrates the relative quality of regression models, with 
the lowest score indicating the highest quality model. Each model in Table 1 subsequently 
improves the AIC demonstrating that the controls are accounted for and improve the overall 
quality of the model when analyzing shutdowns and violence.  
The control variables of military violence, protest and days of consecutive peace 
produce results that are expected. Military violence has a clear relationship with the overall 
level of violence demonstrated by the statistically significant positive coefficient. The 
results of military violence demonstrate the importance of controlling for this variable 
when considering violence on a given day. While on the flip side, days of consecutive 
peace have a negative coefficient (as expected), indicating that days of consecutive peace 
are likely to remain peaceful when all else is held constant.  Additionally, days with protests 
demonstrate a statistically significant positive relationship with violence, reinforcing the 
necessity of controlling for this variable in the final model. 
When focusing on the core of the question, the relationship between digital 
repression and violence, the coefficient (specifically shutdown_lag1) is statistically 
significant (p<0.01) and positive, as seen in all three models. Since the coefficient is 
statistically significant, the null hypothesis is rejected, and the conclusion is that there is 
enough evidence to support the alternative hypothesis that there is a positive relationship 
producing an increase in violence the day after a shutdown event when all other variables 
are held constant. On average, one day following an internet shutdown will see an increase 
33 
in violence (demonstrated in Figure 7 as two-fold the level of the previous day) when all 
else is held constant, as opposed to a day without a shutdown event. It is also interesting to 
note that the positive coefficients on the levels of violence after two days (lag2) and one 
week (lag7) following the shutdown still show as statistically significant, indicating that 
violence remains high after a shutdown for up to a week. Since the lagged analysis still 
shows increased violance, it further reinforces the negative consequences of using digital 
repression to contain violence, if the effects of increased violence resulting from the digital 
repression linger for a week after the initial event. While on the micro level it is challenging 
to see the impact digital repression has on violence when analyzed at the macro level the 
results are clear—that indeed, digital repression increases violence. 
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Table 3. Poisson Regression—Shutdowns and Violence.111 
 
Figure 7 visually depicts the substantive significance between digital shutdowns 
and violence. The positive coefficient indicates an increase in violence one day following 
the digital shutdown. The 95% confidence bands demonstrate that  the level of violence 
one day after a shutdown usually ranges from doubled to tripled what the level of violence 
would be without a digital shutdown. This would mean that a protest in India with a digital 
shutdown would be expected to see two times as much violence as a protest without a 
digital shutdown. 
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 Dependent variable:   
 deaths 
 (1) (2) (3)  
shutdown 2.233*** 1.718*** 1.301*** 
 (0.083) (0.088) (0.087)     
shutdown_lag1 1.634*** 1.176*** 0.912*** 
 (0.099) (0.097) (0.096)     
shutdown_lag2 1.079*** 0.557*** 0.503*** 
 (0.118) (0.118) (0.117)     
shutdown_lag7 1.096*** 0.718*** 0.857*** 
 (0.116) (0.112) (0.110)     
days  0.011 0.025** 
  (0.010) (0.010)     
peace_days  -0.029*** -0.025*** 
  (0.001) (0.001)     
military_violence   2.057*** 
   (0.043)     
protest   0.076*** 
   (0.003)     
Constant -2.497*** -1.508*** -1.997*** 
 (0.020) (0.026) (0.030)     
Observations 29,750 29,750 29,750 
Log Likelihood -11,146.810 -9,789.663 -8,811.309 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 22,303.630 19,593.330 17,640.620  




Figure 7. Poisson Regression—Shutdowns and Violence.112 
To test the robustness of the results from the original model, Table 4 includes longer 
lags of the control variables, while leaving the dependent variable of violence constant. 
Lags of shutdowns model (1), protests model (2) and military violence model (3), are 
individually regressed against violence before finally being combined into one model, 
model (4), that employs a Poisson regression of the fourteen variables against violence, and 
still produces significant results with relation to shutdowns and violence, further 
reinforcing the original findings. Again, lag1 indicates one day following, lag2 indicates 
two days and lag7 indicates seven days after the initial event. Furthermore, Table 2 looks 
at the lagged relationship between violence, military violence, and protests, with the results 
producing expected outcomes; an increase in the overall level of violence for up to a week 
following protests and military violence compared to those days without protests or 
military violence. While these results are expected, they continue to reinforce the need to 
control for them in Model 3, which ultimately has the lowest AIC score and still produces 
significant results. 
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Table 4. Shutdowns, Protests and Military Violence. 113 
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 Dependent variable:   
 deaths 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
shutdown 1.718***   1.179*** 
 (0.088)   (0.088)      
shutdown_lag1 1.176***   0.839*** 
 (0.097)   (0.096)      
shutdown_lag2 0.557***   0.349*** 
 (0.118)   (0.117)      
shutdown_lag7 0.718***   0.573*** 
 (0.112)   (0.113)      
days 0.011   0.026** 
 (0.010)   (0.010)      
peace_days -0.029***   -0.023*** 
 (0.001)   (0.001)      
protest  0.061***  0.062*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003)      
protest_lag  0.045***  0.027*** 
  (0.004)  (0.004)      
protest_lag2  0.026***  0.023*** 
  (0.003)  (0.004)      
protest_lag7  0.063***  0.047*** 
  (0.003)  (0.004)      
military_violence   2.272*** 2.077*** 
   (0.043) (0.044)      
military_violence_lag   0.301*** 0.056 
   (0.075) (0.075)      
military_violence_lag2   0.687*** 0.461*** 
   (0.066) (0.066)      
military_violence_lag7   0.636*** 0.376*** 
   (0.068) (0.069)      
Constant -1.508*** -2.680*** -2.774*** -2.252*** 
 (0.026) (0.022) (0.024) (0.034)       
Observations 29,750 29,750 29,750 29,750 
Log Likelihood -9,789.663 -10,990.510 
-
10,519.300 -8,660.329 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 19,593.330 21,991.030 21,048.600 17,350.660  
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Also interesting is the interaction between days of consecutive peace and digital 
shutdown. Analysis of the results indicates that shutdowns turn peaceful days into violent 
days one day after a shutdown event (lagged results). First, looking at Table 3 and 
analyzing the interaction between pcdays:shutdown, the results indicate as expected, that 
when a shutdown occurs followng a long period of peace, it is more likely to be peaceful 
than when it occurs in a context of recent violence. When pcdays:shutdown_lag1 is 
analyzed, meaning one day following a shutdown on a peaceful day, we see a positive 
relationship with the coefficient. The lagged analysis indicates that when shutdowns are 
used on peaceful protests that the day following will have a higher level of violence as seen 
in Table 5. 
Figure 8 visually reinforces the concept that the interaction between lagged 
shutdowns (one day after) and days of consecutive peace (peace_days) produce a 
substantial increase in violence. The 95% confidence bands demonstrate that on the low 
end of the spectrum the level of violence is still significantly higher than those days without 
shutdowns, while the darker shades indicate how long the days of consecutive peace was 
when the shutdown occurred. These results indicate that using shutdowns on peaceful 
protest produce increased violence on the following day, further emphasizing the inability 
of digital repression to prevent violence. 
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 Dependent variable:   
 deaths  
protest 0.069*** 
 (0.003)   
protest_lag 0.042*** 
 (0.004)   
peace_days -0.025*** 
 (0.001)   
shutdown 1.416*** 
 (0.087)   
shutdown_lag1 0.554*** 
 (0.112)   
shutdown_lag2 0.526*** 
 (0.123)   
shutdown_lag7 0.827*** 
 (0.122)   
military_violence 2.063*** 
 (0.043)   
peace_days:shutdown -0.034*** 
 (0.007)   
peace_days:shutdown_lag1 0.038*** 
 (0.003)   
peace_days:shutdown_lag2 -0.048*** 
 (0.017)   
peace_days:shutdown_lag7 -0.025* 
 (0.015)   
Constant -2.056*** 
 (0.031)    
Observations 29,750 
Log Likelihood -8,715.271 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 17,456.540  




Figure 8. Interaction of Peaceful Days and Shutdowns with Violence.115 
I. CONCLUSION AND ASSESSMENT 
As the global internet model continues to shift toward a concept of internet 
sovereignty, the reality is that strategic shutdowns will continue to be a tactic to fight civil 
unrest in both democracies and autocracies around the world.116 Furthermore, shutdowns 
will continue to be used to hide atrocities committed by authoritarian regimes, as Ghodes 
demonstrated in Syria.117 With this said, large-scale digital disruptions to fight civil unrest 
are globally becoming less frequent, and likely only a last resort due to the financial aspect, 
and we should expect that the increasing trend of social media co-option will continue as 
will the strategic shutdowns examined in this research.118 Despite these trends, India still 
employs digital shutdowns to fight violence. Research demonstrates this tool to fight 
violence is fruitless, and in actuality, creates the opposite effect. While digital shutdowns 
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are likely viewed as an easy and non-violent approach by the state to combat violence 
stemming from civil unrest, in reality, the inverse is true, and there is a quantitative increase 
in violence associated with shutdowns.  
Ultimately, this research will beg the question as to why violence occurs during 
digital shutdowns. Possible answers include but are not limited to, the fragmentation of a 
semi-organized protest, frustration over the inability to express public opinions, and the 
loss of an outlet to deal with anger, or that the state feels empowered to extract harsher 
measures when the ability to digitally document the crackdown is limited. An in-depth look 
into a protest involving digital repression and violence is necessary to better understand 
both why violence occurs during digital repression and the granularity of how digital 




IV. CIVIL UNREST AND DIGITAL REPRESSION: 
AN INTIMATE LOOK 
A. CASE STUDY SELECTION CRITERIA 
India has a long history of civil unrest that predates the partition of India and 
Pakistan and the establishment of the state. Furthermore, India is a country where a wide 
variety of cultures, religions, and castes merge, ultimately leading to division. Selecting a 
case to analyze digital repression at the ground level is essential to providing a clear picture 
of how internet shutdowns and violence intersect. 
Given that internet shutdowns did not reach prominence until 2016, the case study 
window included all documented civil unrest events from 2016 to 2018. Within this 
temporal window, potential cases must have documented violence and use of digital 
repression. The final requirement is that the case needs multiple reporting sources, as it is 
important to note that there is little academic research on individual protests within India 
and that sources primarily include local, regional and national news outlets. The April 2018 
Bharat Band protests met the criteria. Furthermore, the size of the protest drew international 
media attention, allowing for multiple sources to ensure documentation accuracy. 
B. APRIL 2018, #BHARATBANDH PROTESTS 
On the morning of April 2, 2018, social media in India started to circulate 
#BharatBandh along with pictures of protesters in India stopping trains in Punjab, rallying 
against the weakening of the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes Prevention of Atrocities 
Act (SC/ST) protection act.119 Throughout three days, India would see digital shutdowns, 
massive protests and violence culminating with ten dead and hundreds arrested.120 While 
                                                 
119 “Bharat Bandh: Protests by Dalit Groups over SC/ST Act on April 2, 2018—As It Happened,” Zee 
News, April 2, 2018, http://zeenews.india.com/india/live-updates/bharat-bandh-live-news-updates-strike-
across-india-2095564; Sandya Fuchs, “Indian Supreme Court Curbs One of the World’s Most Powerful 
Anti-Discrimination Laws,” Opendemocracy.Net, May 26, 2018, 
https://www.printfriendly.com/p/g/7Kxgrw. 
120 Fuchs, “Indian Supreme Court Curbs One of the World’s Most Powerful Anti-Discrimination 
Laws.” 
42 
this sounds dramatic, protests are commonplace in India, a country where divides between 
social castes, religions and cultures clash in a nation that is quickly closing the gap with 
China to have the world’s largest population by 2025.121 The collision of digital repression, 
digital liberation, and violence during civil unrest in India will be analyzed using the social 
movement theory of McAdam et al. for the contextual framework.122 Social movement 
theory provides the essential understanding for what contributed to the establishment of 
the 2018 Bharat Bandh protests and to better understand the subsequent repression 
employed during the movement. The foundation of social movement theory is collective 
grievances, political opportunities, mobilizing structures and finally how the movement 
framed the narrative which provides insight into why the social movement arose and 
thrived.123 Of note, the conclusion will analyze how digital shutdowns and levels of 
violence impacted the social movement. 
C. GRIEVANCES 
At the core of the Bharat Bandh protests of 2018 lies the SC/ST act.124 The SC/ST 
act was established in 1989 and protects India’s formerly untouchable (Dalit) 
communities.125 Sandhya Fuchs, a scholar specializing the interaction between state law 
and local forms of law and order, who spent time studying at the Indian Institute of Dalit 
Studies (IIDS) in India, explains that the controversy surrounding SC/ST act lies in the 
severe punishments that it can impose.126 The punishments include immediate arrest with 
a minimum of six months to five years of imprisonment accompanying violations of the 
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SC/ST act.127 Fuchs continues to explain that since the origins of the law, there has always 
been a significant push to remove or reduce the severity of the act, and as of 20 March 
2018, the act was adjusted to curb suspected misuse. Dalit groups perceived this weakening 
of the SC/ST as an injustice.128 While it is important to note that Fuchs’ own research in 
Rajasthan contradicts the widespread misuse of the act suggested by India’s Supreme 
Court, the act remains both highly controversial and complex. Controversy aside, caste 
violence is still a significant issue in India. Amnesty International reports that in 2016 alone 
there were 40,000 crimes on lower castes.129 Ultimately, it was the perceived injustice from 
the weakening of the SC/ST act that caused the mass protests of 2 April 2018. 
D. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES 
The March 20 Supreme Court ruling on the SC/ST act provided the opportunity for 
Dalit groups to take to the streets and protest collective anger. Specifically, the Supreme 
Court of India removed the mandatory arrest portion of the law along with the registration 
of law violators.130 On March 21, local news stated that members of the Bharatiya Janata 
Party (BJP) which are traditionally known to have strong Hindu nationalist priorities, 
pressed the Union Law Minister to review the newly added amendment.131 Indian national 
news indicated that the BJP state governments were using excessive retaliatory violence 
against a peaceful Dalit protest.132 Initially, to demonstrate outrage over the SC/ST act 
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changes, small protests started to occur from March 21 to April 2. Local leaders in the town 
of Phagwara, Punjab who are part of the Dalit community, called for a Bandh, which would 
be the actual start of the massive April 2 Bhara Bandh protests.133 Local news reported that 
the date of April 2 was established by a WhatsApp group operating out of western Uttar 
Prades. The message primarily stated that it was time to take the conversation from 
WhatsApp to the streets and shut down India on April 2.134  
E. MOBILIZING STRUCTURES 
Academic literature agrees that social media has adjusted the landscape of social 
movements, specifically in the mobilization structures, creating horizontal movements.135 
Horizontal (leaderless) movements drew significant attention during the Arab Spring when 
many of the movements were decentralized and pushed multiple agendas 
simultaneously.136 While research often concludes that leaders are critical in social 
movements, it does not change the fact that they still occur worldwide.137 It is essential to 
understand how and why horizontal movements arise, as research indicates that this is 
primarily what the Bharat Bandh protest embodied. 
During the Bharat Bandh in 2018, the protests were reported to be primarily 
established through social media, with WhatsApp being the primary application used to 
organize marches.138 Furthermore, the movement did not have direct leadership, but rather 
a horizontal movement through the use of social media, which primarily played a role in 
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mobilizing the location of marches.139 It is important to note that opposing groups are 
known to infiltrate Dalit protests and change the narrative to shout pro-Pakistan slogans, 
as had happened in a previous Dalit protest in February 2016.140 Users on social media 
suggest that if this was seen at protests that they should, “Beat them up and shoot the whole 
thing on video.”141 While social media is often used to call for violence, it theoretically 
makes sense to shutdown the internet and effectively kill this violent rhetoric, but again, 
research indicates that shutting down the internet will have an opposite effect.  
In answering why social media is often used, Anant Kamath, a scholar studying 
how Dalit communities have used ICTs to further themselves finds that ultimately that 
despite having access to the internet, Dalit groups remain low within the countries relative 
literacy rate, furthermore the technology is primarily being used as a tool for 
communication.142 Anant Kamath notes that the use of technology as only a 
communication tool exasperates the developmental divide among castes in India, and the 
divide will remain strong until there is greater political participation and increased 
education among Dalit Groups.143 Kamath’s research indicates that shutdowns inhibit Dalit 
groups from political participation, only further alienating marginalized groups. 
F. FRAMING 
Bharat Bandh translates to “shut down India,” in Hindi, Bharat meaning India and 
Bandh meaning closed, or shutdown. The April 2018 bandh is not the first Bharat Bandh 
in India, as bandhs are a common form of protest, while a powerful tool of civil 
disobedience it is also highly controversial.144 Research seems to indicate that bandhs are 
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distinguished from one another primarily by the date they occur. The April 2018 Bharat 
Bandh epitomizes the ideals of a bandh, by creating a space for a political conversation 
through civil disobedience and collective action. As for how the bandh forms a narrative, 
it is primarily through motivational pictures or internet memes that were circulated to 
embolden people to protest.145 On the surface, the framing of the narrative is standard for 
modern horizontal movements and protests, without traditional leadership framing an 
overarching narrative, but rather individuals with collective outrage.146  
While individuals would offer up suggestions to the protesting community at large, 
such as anticipating counter-protests, again, research indicates that very little was done on 
the surface to shape the narrative.147 Bandhs tend to follow a similar life-cycle of outrage, 
anger, concession, and remission, with the narratives primarily circulating the grievances 
to build the common base of unrest. 
G. DIGITAL LIBERATION, REPRESSION AND VIOLENCE DURING 
#BHARATBANDH 
While it is easy to fixate on the role technology played in enabling civil unrest, it is 
important to remember that civil unrest is not a new phenomenon; that merely by existing, 
technology does not produce civil unrest but rather changes its dynamics.148 Furthermore, 
the timeline of violence is important to understand how the digital shutdown occurred and 
what immediately followed.  
Initial reports and photos from the April 2 protest indicate the collective action 
focused on blocking streets and rail stations. It is important to note that blocking streets is 
a common tactic in civil disobedience, with an aim at causing disruption to routine and 
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forcing attention to the movement.149 Protesters can be seen marching, taking photos, and 
placing bricks and tires in the road. While initially, the protest seemed large, a level of 
organization is apparent. As the protest gained momentum, protester deaths are noted in 
reports of violence.150 Videos and photos of the early stages of the protest also indicate that 
the majority of the protest is working-age adults, but as the protest continues into the late 
morning and early afternoon, younger adults are seen in videos and photos, which is likely 
related to both the mass disruption and the closing of schools in anticipation of the 
protest.151  
The protest quickly moved to social media, as a fight to control the narrative began 
between the BJP, protesters and the state. From approximately 10 a.m. local time to 5 p.m. 
local time there were a reported six deaths from protester clashes with riot control police 
forces.152 While reports conflict on who the aggressors were in the violence, YouTube 
videos show alleged protester-on-protester violence. In one video posted on YouTube, a 
younger crowd can be seen beating a man on the ground as older men step in to stop the 
crowd. While the older men initially quell the violence, it is not until the riot control police 
arrive that the crowd disperses, leaving the wounded man on the ground.153 The protest 
continues to remain semi-organized, as trucks lead lines of protesters down roads playing 
music, as the protesters chant and march behind.154  
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At 7 p.m. local time, Section 144 was imposed, and internet services were shut 
down.155 Shortly after Section 144 was imposed, the protest transitioned into amorphous 
riots with a heavy emphasis on looting.156 It is possible people feel emboldened by the 
inability to use ICTs and transitioned to opportunistic looting, combined with feelings of 
helplessness and frustration from further repression on an already marginalized group. By 
the time the protest slowed down on April 4, another four people would die during the 
ensuing violence.157 Ultimately, it is apparent that shutting off the internet did not stop, or 
slow the violence, but rather it forced an environmental and subsequently a human behavior 
change in how the collective action evolved, resulting in increased violence. Interestingly, 
while technology is not responsible for creating protests, it becomes an expected resource. 
When that resource is denied, there is a frustration associated with its loss. Additionally, 
the internet likely provides an outlet for expression, while also providing a degree of 
organization to the protests.  
India does not plan to alter its tactics regarding the use of strategic shutdowns. 
Despite this research demonstrating that shutdowns do not stop violence and other 
academic research demonstrating that shutdowns do not stop mobilizations, the question 
remains why do we see high rates of shutdowns across the world, but specifically in India?  
It appears that the notoriety from the repression of networked collective action by 
autocracies to eliminate opposing views garnered significant attention by states globally, 
which could be viewed as a metric of success, even if the metric is flawed.  This is likely 
compounded with the concept that in democracies, demonstrating action to political base 
is an important aspect of power.  The action of strategic shutdown is likely viewed as a 
positive non-violent approach to a civil unrest event, while in reality, the opposite is true. 
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H. BEYOND THE #BHARATBANDH 
The Bharat Bandh case study provides a glimpse into digital repression, violence, 
protest and civil unrest. As technology changes, collective action and states adapt at 
varying speeds, but technology is rapidly outpacing both research and norms. States are no 
longer denying the internet’s consequences, but instead, acknowledge it for the dangers 
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V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE STUDIES 
A. AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
This research provides a qualitative and quantitative analysis of how digital 
repression impacts violence in India. Furthermore, the research demonstrated that the 
current tactics of utilizing internet shutdowns to combat or contain violence are ineffective 
at best and damaging at worst. While this research primarily focused on how digital 
repression affected violence, it also touched on how current digital repression appears to 
change the dynamics of mobilization during the collective action, but this is an area that 
remains open for academic research to answer fully. Additionally, a comparison of 
violence levels between autocracies and democracies following digital shutdowns would 
further provide insight. Finally, sentiment and narrative analysis of both the protesters and 
state before and after the shutdown would provide a deeper understanding of why the 
increase of violence occurs following a shutdown.  
B. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS 
This thesis is a stark reminder that the internet is deeply intertwined with human 
behavior and that misunderstanding this implication is dangerous.  It is concerning that the 
tactic of using digital repression as a tool to stop internal violence is increasing in India, as 
the data demonstrates that the opposite is true.  While there are many non-governmental 
organizations approaching the problem of digital repression as a freedom of speech issue, 
the relationship of digital repression and increased violence goes unnoticed.  The challenge 
of drawing the connection between digital repression and violence is that the effects are 
not immediate.  The moment the internet is turned off the streets do not instantly turn 
violent, but rather the day following, as the protest organizational structure fails, and the 
internet as an outlet of expression goes away that the civil unrest events increase in 
violence. 
The battle between digital liberation and digital repression is far from over. The 
scale will continue to swing back and forth from the states to individuals as the world 
struggles to understand the complex and evolving nature of technology. While there are 
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still many unknowns in how technology, collective action, and repression evolves, this 
research on digital repression in India clearly shows a relationship between digital 
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